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TIMOR-LESTE V. AUSTRALIA: “GUERRILLA TACTICS” AND SCHOOLYARD BULLIES IN 
STATE ARBITRATION 
By 
Sarah Whittington
*
 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
  The requirement of “zealous advocacy” in adversarial adjudication proceedings 
has recently come under attack. While scholars acknowledge that power shifting tactics 
have always existed in dispute resolution, recent practice seems to require a new 
vocabulary to describe aggressive representation.
1
 Recognizing the need to reframe the 
discussion, scholars and practitioners apply the term “guerrilla tactics” to define litigation 
misconduct that threatens to undermine the legitimacy of arbitration procedures.
2
 The 
term refers to adjudication tactics that range from using dilatory tactics to criminal acts of 
violence,
3
 which are being used with increasing frequency to frustrate the arbitral 
process.
4
 
The notion that parties to an arbitration proceeding would use violence to frustrate 
procedures or avoid award enforcement is an obvious threat to the system and need not 
be elaborated for the purposes of this article. The recourse to arbitration is evidence of an 
                                                 
*
 Sarah Whittington is an Associate Editor of The Yearbook on Arbitration and Mediation and a 2015 Juris 
Doctor Candidate at The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law. 
1
 See, e.g., Günther J. Horvath & Stephan Wilske, Chapter 6: Conclusion and Outlook, in GUERRILLA 
TACTICS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 341, 341 (Günther J. Horvath & Stephan Wilske eds., 2013).  
2
 See, e.g., Robert Pfeiffer & Stephan Wilske, Chapter 1, §1.01: An Etymological and Historical Overview, 
in GUERRILLA TACTICS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 1, 3 (Günther J. Horvath & Stephan Wilske eds., 
2013) (Wilske and Pfeiffer analogize conventional guerrilla warfare and “guerrilla tactics” in international 
arbitration as “a broad collective of unconventional means, which undermine the mechanism’s envisioned 
conventional mode of operation.”); Loretta Malintoppi, Guerrilla Tactics in International Arbitration & 
Litigation A Fine Line—How to Counter and Employ, TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. 2 (Nov. 12, 2010), 
http://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=1611 (last visited May 4, 2014); 
Despina Fruth Oprisan, Guerrilla Tactics, Romanian Experience, TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. 2 (Nov. 12, 
2010), http://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=1616 (last visited May 4, 2014); 
Shai Wade & Reed Smith, Guerrilla Tactics before Investment Tribunals: from Counsel’s Point of View, 
TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. 2 (Nov. 12, 2010), http://www.transnational-dispute-
management.com/article.asp?key=1609 (last visited May 4, 2014). 
3
 The assault of a judge during the Iran-U.S. tribunal deliberations was the first example of extreme tactics. 
Other events include: the kidnapping of an arbitrator by Indonesia, the imprisonment of a Chinese 
arbitrator, and the possible murder of an arbitrator. For this and further examples see, e.g., CHARLES N. 
BROWER & JASON D. BRUESCHKE, THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 168-69 (1998); Abba 
Kolo, Witness Intimidation, Tampering and Other Related Abuses of Process in Investment Arbitration: 
Possible Remedies Available to the Arbitral Tribunal, 26 ARB. INT’L, no. 1, 2010, at 43, 49; Wu Ming, The 
Strange Case of Wang Shenchang, 24 J. INT’L ARB., no. 1, 2007, at 63; Jacques Werner, When Arbitration 
Becomes War, 17 J. INT’L ARB., no. 4, 2000, at 97. 
4
 Wade & Smith, supra note 2. 
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attempt by disputing parties to resolve their dispute through civilized judicial means. This 
attempt, however, is quickly thwarted when one party employs “guerrilla tactics” against 
the opposing party. There are two main forms that “guerilla tactics” take: the overt, 
violent acts are extreme examples that draw attention, sanctions, and preventative 
measures; on the other hand, the more subtle dilatory or procedural “guerrilla tactics” 
may be more dangerous because they often go unnoticed and unsanctioned.
5
 The 
increasing prevalence of such maneuvers raises questions about the role and ability of 
arbitral tribunals to sanction this behavior.
6
 
The globalization of arbitration has led to an increase in the use of “guerrilla 
tactics.”7 As the number of total participants in arbitral systems increased, accountability 
and the necessity to maintain an ethical reputation decreased.
8
 The introduction of 
litigation specialists into commercial arbitration brought dilatory tactics and procedural 
maneuverings typical of traditional litigation.
9
 From commercial arbitration, the use of 
sovereign power plays and “guerrilla tactics” has spread to investor-state arbitration, and 
Timor-Leste v. Australia exemplifies how similar tactics have now reached the realm of 
state-to-state arbitration.
10
 
 Currently, no adjudication system is safe from “guerrilla tactics,” and overzealous 
representation is creating a framework for an “ethical ‘race to the bottom.’”11 The use of 
these tactics is especially troubling in investor-state or state-to-state arbitration, in which 
sovereign parties have unilateral access to extreme tactics resulting in power imbalances 
that make equitable resolution of any dispute unlikely.
12
 Fortunately, the circumstances 
                                                 
5
 Horvath & Wilske, supra note 1, at 340; Kolo, supra note 3, at 47-48. 
6
 Horvath & Wilske, supra note 1, at 343. 
7
 Robert Pfeiffer & Stephan Wilske, Chapter 1, §1.03: The Emergence of the Guerrilla Tactics 
Phenomenon in International Arbitration, in GUERRILLA TACTICS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 16, 17-
19 (Günther J. Horvath & Stephan Wilske eds., 2013). 
8
 William J. Rowley, Chapter 1, §1.04: Guerrilla Tactics and Developing Issues, in GUERRILLA TACTICS IN 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 20, 20 (Günther J. Horvath & Stephan Wilske eds., 2013).  
9
 Herfried Wöss, “Guerrilla Tactics”: Litigation and Arbitration in Mexico, TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. 2 
(Nov. 12, 2010), http://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=1615 (last visited 
May 4, 2014).  
10
 Press Release, International Court of Justice, Timor-Leste Institutes Proceedings Against Australia and 
Requests the Court to Indicate Provisional Measures (Timor-Leste v. Australia) (Dec. 18, 2013). 
11
 Horvath & Wilske, supra note 1, at 341-42 (quoting Catherine Rogers to explain that the outcome-driven 
practice of some arbitration litigators sacrifices ethical choices because of competition for clients).  
12
 Pfeiffer & Wilske, supra note 7, at 19; Malintoppi, supra note 2, at ¶¶ 4 and 6. See also, Pfeiffer & 
Wilske, supra note 2, at 3 (noting that “guerrilla tactics” may be used by both parties regardless of their 
conventional strength because the definition of strength in arbitration will be determined by which party 
has the stronger substantive argument and the means to argue it before the tribunal. The weaker party in a 
case will use “guerrilla tactics” to avoid the central legal dispute at issue). 
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surrounding the Timor-Leste case provide an opportunity for scholars and practitioners to 
gain awareness about “guerrilla tactics” and their implications. Moreover, Timor-Leste 
will aid scholars and practitioners in developing a vocabulary for the phenomenon that 
may prove useful in prospectively preempting the use of “guerrilla tactics” to frustrate 
legitimate arbitral proceedings.
13
 
 Allegedly, Australia has engaged in “guerrilla tactics,” as the stronger party, prior 
to and during the arbitral proceedings. The dispute concerns the formation and continued 
application of treaties that apportioned revenue and control of oil-rich areas of the Timor 
Sea between the two nations. This case will not only bring to light the prevalence of 
“guerrilla tactics” in investment and state-to-state arbitration, but may also allow for a 
greater understanding of the motivations behind such actions, especially by state-actors 
who generally wield more power in negotiations. Ultimately, this case could provide 
international courts, state actors, investors, and practitioners a better understanding of 
what will constitute “guerrilla tactics” in investment arbitration moving forward, what the 
defenses to allegations of “guerrilla tactics” may be, and what sanctions can be expected 
or are available depending on the outcome of the case and the analysis the court uses. 
II.   BACKGROUND OF THE TREATY DISPUTE BETWEEN TIMOR-LESTE AND AUSTRALIA 
Timor-Leste v. Australia is an ongoing dispute being adjudicated before the 
International Court of Justice (“ICJ”).14 Timor-Leste alleges, among other things, that 
Australia engaged in “guerrilla tactics” to frustrate an arbitration proceeding that was 
initiated to adjudicate a state-to-state dispute over ownership and possession of oil-rich 
territories within the Timor Sea. Prior to the dispute, Timor-Leste and Australia enjoyed 
close diplomatic and economic ties after Timor-Leste achieved its independence from 
Indonesia.
15
 Timor-Leste strained the relationship when it notified Australia on April 23, 
2013, that it was seeking arbitration regarding the 2006 Treaty on Certain Maritime 
Arrangements in the Timor Sea (“CMATS”).16 Timor-Leste alleges that the negotiations 
                                                 
13
 Horvath & Wilske, supra note 1, at 342 (citing, William Rowley, supra note 8; Lucy Reed, Tools 
Available to the Arbitral Tribunal, Ch. 2, §2.04[A], in GUERRILLA TACTICS IN INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION 93, 93 (Günther J. Horvath & Stephan Wilske eds., 2013) (explaining that some scholars 
desire a “universal code of ethical conduct” applied to international practitioners in order to limit and 
sanction “guerrilla tactics,” but others believe that the infractions should be handled on a case-by-case basis 
and overregulation will damage international arbitration as well. The authors pose many questions, but 
admit to not having a solution to the problems beyond providing knowledge and useful tips for 
practitioners). 
14
 Press Release, International Court of Justice, supra note 10. 
15
 See, e.g., Dennis Wilson, International Law, History, and the Development of Sovereign Claims by 
Timor-Leste and Australia in the Timor Sea, 
http://www.academia.edu/3847245/An_update_on_the_2013_Treaty_Arbitration_between_Timor_Leste_a
nd_Australia (last visited Jan. 28, 2014); The La’o Hamutuk Bulletin, THE TIMOR-LESTE INSTITUTE FOR 
RECONSTRUCTION MONITORING AND ANALYSIS, Vol. 7, No. 1 (April 2006), available at 
http://www.laohamutuk.org/Bulletin/2006/Apr/bulletinv7n1.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2014).  
16
 The CMATS Treaty divided the disputed sea floor in the Joint Petroleum Development Area (“JDPA”) 
of the Timor Sea not previously allocated to either Timor-Leste or Australia. CMATS further allocated 
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were not conducted in good faith.
17
 Australia denied these claims.
18
 Soon after 
notification of arbitration, however, Timor-Leste reaffirmed its commitment to a strong 
relationship with Australia but acknowledged that the relationship was evolving.
19
 
The 2006 CMATS treaty was executed on February 23, 2007, along with the 2003 
International Unitisation Agreement for Greater Sunrise (“IUA”).20 These two treaties 
reinforced the 2002 Timor Sea Treaty.
21
 Timor-Leste now seeks to invalidate both 
treaties because it claims to have statements from whistleblowers and former Australia 
Security Intelligence Organisation (“ASIO”) agents who participated in the bugging of a 
meeting room of Timor-Leste’s cabinet during the 2004 treaty negotiations.22  If these 
                                                                                                                                                 
revenues in the JDPA and Greater Sunrise Unit Area between Timor-Leste and Australia for exploration or 
production of petroleum. Although the language and apportionment ratios appear to favor Timor-Leste 
(Timor-Leste receives 90% of the extraction revenue within the JDPA, for example), the division may 
actually be a greater benefit to Australia because the treaty postponed delimiting the maritime boundaries 
between Timor-Leste and Australia. Under CMATS, Timor-Leste and Australia will not make maritime 
boundary claims for fifty years. Some scholars believe that the boundaries will assign the shared areas to 
Timor-Leste according to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Another 
benefit to Australia is the stipulation that Australia receives all revenue from “downstream” production tax 
revenues which will generate more money over the course of the treaty than the “upstream” extraction 
revenue that Timor-Leste was apportioned. See Treaty Between the Government of Australia and the 
Government of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste on Certain Maritime Arrangements in the Timor 
Sea (CMATS), Austl.-Timor-Leste, Jan. 12, 2006, [2007] A.T.S. 12; United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea art. 2 and 15, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397. For an in-depth explanation of the timeline 
of events surrounding treaty negotiations between Timor-Leste and Australia regarding oil reserves in the 
Timor Sea and the division of revenue and areas, see The La’o Hamutuk Bulletin, supra note 15, at 3-7; 
Wilson, supra note 15; AUSTRALIA DEP’T OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE, Australia-Timor-Leste 
Maritime Arrangements, http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/timor-leste/fs_maritime_arrangements.html (last 
visited Jan. 29, 2014). 
17
 See, e.g., Joint Media Release, Senator Hon. Bob Carr, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Hon. Mark 
Dreyfus QC MP, Attorney General, Arbitration Under the Timor Sea Treaty (May 3, 2013), 
http://foreignminister.gov.au/releases/2013/bc_mr_130503.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2014). 
18
 Id.   
19
 EAST TIMOR LAW AND JUSTICE BULLETIN, Statement by Government of Timor-Leste Regarding the 
Pending Arbitration Between Timor-Leste and Australia on CMATS Treaty, June 10, 2013 [ed. Warren 
Wright], http://www.easttimorlawandjusticebulletin.com/2013/06/statement-by-government-of-timor-
leste.html (last visited Jan 29, 2014). 
20
 AUSTRALIA DEP’T OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE, supra note 16.  
21
 Carr and Dreyfus, supra note 17 (all treaties delineated boundaries for petroleum exploration and 
extraction and divisions of revenue). 
22
 Id.; Sebastian Perry, Australia Targets Witness and Counsel in East Timor Spying Case, GLOBAL ARB. 
REV. (Dec. 4, 2013), http://globalarbitrationreview.com/news/article/32101/australia-targets-witness-
counsel-east-timor-spying-case/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2014); Nick Miller, East Timor Seeks to Scrap Oil 
Treaty with Australia in The Hague Over Spying Allegations, THE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Dec. 6, 
2013), http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/east-timor-seeks-to-scrap-oil-treaty-with-
australia-in-the-hague-over-spying-allegations-20131206-2yufv.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2014). 
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allegations are true, this will likely damage Australia’s international reputation because it 
is a developed country subjugating a weaker nation for economic gain, similar to former 
colonial relationships.
23
 To invalidate the treaty, Timor-Leste must prove that Australia 
used the information gained through espionage to improve its bargaining position and the 
outcome of the treaty. Although the 2006 CMATS treaty does not have a provision for 
arbitration, Timor-Leste wants to use the 2002 Timor Sea Treaty’s dispute resolution 
language to bring this case before an arbitral tribunal.
24
  
After Timor-Leste’s announcement seeking arbitration, ASIO agents raided the 
offices of Timor-Leste’s legal counsel and the home of a former ASIO officer to seize 
documents, electronic materials, and passports. The seizure was executed the day before 
the arbitral tribunal was to convene; however, a continuance was required because the 
witness and counsel could not travel.
25
 Timor-Leste’s attorney immediately condemned 
the seizure because all the materials taken were privileged communications, and the 
passport seizure was a dilatory tactic to prevent arbitration.
26
 The Australian Attorney-
General responded that the documents were seized because of national security interests 
and denied the warrants were intended to “impede or subvert” the arbitration.27  
Timor-Leste instituted proceedings before the ICJ on December 17, 2013, 
requesting the return of all seized documents regarding the pending arbitration against 
Australia.
28
 During hearings before the ICJ in January 2014, Australia announced plans to 
contest the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal to hear the case because Australia now 
denounces arbitral jurisdiction of investment claims and has withdrawn consent to the ICJ 
for disputes related to delimitation of maritime boundaries.
29
 The ICJ declined to stay its 
                                                 
23
 Paul Daley, Timor-Leste Spying Claims: Australia has a History of Bugging its Neighbour, THE 
GUARDIAN (Nov. 22, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/29/east-timor-spying-claims-
australia-bugging (last visited May 4, 2014).  
24
 Wilson, supra note 15, at ¶ 30. 
25
 Ministerial Statement, Sen. Hon. George Brandis, QC, Execution of ASIO Search Warrants (Dec. 4, 
2013), http://www.attorneygeneral.gov.au/Mediareleases/Pages/2013/Fourth%20quarter/4-December-2013-
--Ministerial-Statement---Execution-of-ASIO-Search-Warrants.aspx, (last visited Jan. 29, 2014); Perry, 
supra note 22. 
26
 Perry, supra note 22. 
27
 Ministerial Statement, supra note 25. The Attorney-General cited the ASIO Act of 1979 which allows 
him to issue search warrants, at the request of the ASIO, if there are “reasonable grounds” to believe the 
documents contain critical security intelligence and further defines security to apply to this situation. The 
Attorney-General also noted that lawyer-client privilege is not a defense for violations of security. 
28
 Press Release, International Court of Justice, supra note 10. Timor-Leste asked the Court to declare that 
Australia’s acts violated Timor-Leste’s sovereignty under international and domestic law, that the 
documents should be returned and any copies destroyed, and that Australia issue a formal apology. Timor-
Leste also requested provisional measures to protect the information seized. 
29
 Press Release, International Court of Justice, Questions Relating to the Seizure and Detention of Certain 
Documents and Data (Timor-Leste v. Australia) Conclusion of the Public Hearings on the Request for the 
Indication of Provisional Measures Submitted by Timor-Leste (Jan. 22, 2014) (Australia argued the Court 
should refuse Timor-Leste’s requests and that ICJ proceedings be stayed until the pending treaty arbitration 
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proceedings pending arbitration, which is scheduled to begin in September 2014. Instead, 
the ICJ set time-limits for the initial pleadings by finding this dispute distinct from the 
dispute before the arbitral tribunal.
30
 The ICJ also determined it has jurisdiction to 
determine if Australia must return the seized materials.
31
 On March 3, 2014, the ICJ 
announced provisional measures that require Australia to keep all seized materials sealed 
until further notice from the Court and to not interfere with communications between 
Timor-Leste and its lawyers in any pending or future litigation.
32
  
III. TIMOR-LESTE AND AUSTRALIA’S ALLEGED USES OF “GUERRILLA TACTICS” 
A. Timor-Leste 
Timor-Leste needs the arbitral tribunal to declare that the CMATS Treaty was 
negotiated in bad faith so Timor-Leste can renegotiate for a more equitable share of the 
downstream oil revenue allocated in the treaty.
33
 Under the current treaty, Australia 
estimates that Timor-Leste could receive US$15 billion from revenue sharing, but that is 
significantly less than the US$40 billion projected for Australia’s profit.34 If Timor-Leste 
had a more equitable division of downstream revenue it would be able to receive tax 
revenue from refining plants that are currently earning Australia US$2.5 billion.
35
 
                                                                                                                                                 
is settled before the tribunal). See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, DECLARATIONS RECOGNIZING 
THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT AS COMPULSORY, Australia, (Mar. 22, 2002) http://www.icj-
cij.org/jurisdiction/?p1=5&p2=1&p3=3&code=AU); Luke Nottage, The Rise and Possible Fall of Investor-
State Arbitration in Asia: A Skeptic’s View of Australia’s “Gillard Government Trade Policy Statement,” 
TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. 5 (2011), http://www.transnational-dispute-
management.com/article.asp?key=1767) (quoting the Minister of Trade’s pronouncement that Australia 
would no longer be including investor-state dispute resolution in trade agreements); Wilson, supra note 15, 
at ¶ 28. 
30
 Questions Relating to the Seizure and Detention of Certain Documents and Data (Timor-Leste v. 
Australia) 2014 I.C.J. 156 (Jan. 28) (order fixing the time-limits for the filing of written pleadings). 
31
 Id.  
32
 Questions Relating to the Seizure and Detention of Certain Documents and Data, Request for the 
Indication of Provisional Measures Order, (Timor-Leste v. Australia) 2014 I.C.J. 156 (Mar. 3). 
33
 As stated previously, Timor-Leste receives no “downstream” revenue from the JDPA, although there is a 
provision in Art. 5 ¶ 9 that requires Australia to pay Timor-Leste “half the aggregate of the Australian 
revenue component…less the Timor-Leste revenue component.” Certain Maritime Arrangements in the 
Timor Sea, supra note 16, at ¶ 9. Since the treaty went into effect in 2007 Timor-Leste has received ninety 
percent of the “upstream” revenue, but Australia has been in control of the Bayu-Undan processing project 
which began in 2004 and includes a pipeline directly to a processing plant in Darwin, Australia. 
CONOCOPHILLIPS AUSTRALIA: OUR PROJECTS, BAYU-UNDAN, http://www.conocophillips.com.au/our-
business-activities/our-projects/Pages/bayu-undan.aspx (last visited Jan. 29, 2014).  
34
 AUSTRALIA DEP’T OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE, supra note 16. 
35
 The La’o Hamutuk Bulletin, supra note 15. 
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Finally, Timor-Leste is now more stable and developed than in 2006, and, therefore, 
better equipped to contest questionably predatory provisions within a treaty that arguably 
apportions its rightful maritime territory.
36
 
Timor-Leste’s clear motive for wanting to change the current revenue sharing 
model requires forcing arbitration on Australia, which may be a “guerrilla tactic” in its 
own right. Timor-Leste has no recourse to arbitration through the CMATS treaty alone 
and must use the initial Timor Sea Treaty from 2002, which contained an arbitral clause 
and was incorporated by the CMATS treaty, to obtain jurisdiction.
37
 The recourse to 
arbitration is meant to be based on an agreement between the parties, but Australia 
denounces investment arbitration. If termination of the treaty was all that Timor-Leste 
sought, it had other means available.
38
 The only way for Timor-Leste to renegotiate the 
treaty or assert its sovereign rights and delimit its maritime border with Australia, 
however, is to use arbitration as a weapon against Australia. It needs an international, 
binding award from the arbitral tribunal declaring the CMATS Treaty invalid. Although 
Timor-Leste seeks a change in the treaty, it does not appear that it seeks to change its 
relationship with Australia in any substantive way.
39
 
B. Australia 
Unlike Timor-Leste’s possible “guerrilla” intentions, the alleged “guerrilla 
tactics” employed by Australia are more traditional and more maliciously motivated. 
Australia appears to be the diplomatically stronger and economically richer bully in this 
situation. If the allegations of espionage during the 2004 treaty talks are substantiated, 
Australia may suffer international embarrassment and lose prestige among economic and 
diplomatic partners.
40
 This begs the question, why would a powerful, developed country, 
                                                 
36
 See Certain Maritime Arrangements in the Timor Sea, supra note 16, at Art. 4 ¶ 2. This allows domestic 
legislation to supersede the treaty and activities related to petroleum and other resources to continue in the 
area governed by the treaty if sanctioned by domestic legislation in effect as of May 19, 2002. Timor-
Leste’s independence was recognized on May 20, 2002, so it has no domestic legislation regarding oil or 
fishing rights in the Timor Sea, but Australia does. See also Wilson, supra note 15, at ¶ 28; The La’o 
Hamutuk Bulletin, supra note 15. 
37
 See Press Release, International Court of Justice, supra note 10; Ministerial Statement, supra note 26; 
Wilson, supra note 15, at ¶ 30. 
38
 Certain Maritime Arrangements in the Timor Sea, supra note 16, at Art. 12 ¶ 2a-2b. Either party could 
terminate the treaty with three months notice if there was no agreed upon development plan for the Sunrise 
IUA Unit Area in 2013. If the area were developed in the future, however, the treaty would come back into 
force for the duration of the agreed upon time. 
39
 Statement by Government of Timor-Leste, supra note 19. 
40
 Kate Lamb, Timor-Leste v. Australia: What Each Country Stands to Lose, THE GUARDIAN, (Jan. 23, 
2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/23/timor-leste-v-australia-analysis) (last visited May 4, 
2014). The author also realizes that this is speculative, but if the recent disclosure of the United States’ 
wiretapping program by the National Security Agency (NSA), for a similar reason of “national security,” is 
analogous, then Australia may be facing a response of its allies similar to that endured by the U.S. See, e.g., 
Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers Daily, THE GUARDIAN 
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like Australia, employ “guerrilla tactics” to bully a weaker, dependent nation? Australia’s 
self-interested actions during treaty negotiations may be domestically defensible, but its 
new “guerrilla tactics” are attempting to perpetuate dominance in the name of national 
security and international reputation. Left unsanctioned this will set a dangerous 
precedent for allowable actions by stronger parties in investment treaties. 
Australia is using “guerrilla tactics” to avoid an arbitral decision that condemns its 
previous actions and invalidates a treaty that favors Australia’s economic interests.41 
Australia will attempt to withdraw consent to the ICJ to hear the dispute.
42
 Without 
consent, the ICJ will be unable to rule on the merits and determine if Australia’s actions 
were condemnable. Australia also plans to challenge the jurisdiction of the arbitral 
tribunal, rendering it unable to determine if the treaty should be terminated.
43
 Australia 
wants to defend and increase its oil revenue from the treaty, and “guerrilla tactics” 
accomplish this goal. If Australia’s tactics work, Timor-Leste will be left with no other 
recourse to renegotiate.
44
 
If jurisdiction is accepted, Australia will argue that its national security interests 
are at stake and it must protect its ASIO methods and agents from accountability.
45
 
Australia needs to use dilatory tactics because it seems to have no substantive legal 
defense to justify the information confiscated from the former ASIO agent and Timor-
Leste’s counsel.46 If the tribunal accepts Australia’s national security argument, which is 
often received deferentially,
47
 there will be no evidence of espionage and Timor-Leste 
cannot prove its claims.  
                                                                                                                                                 
(Jun. 5, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order (last 
visited May 4, 2014). 
41
 Perry, supra note 22. See, e.g., Horvath & Wilske, supra note 1, at 341. 
42
 Press Release, Questions Relating to the Seizure and Detention of Certain Documents and Data, supra 
note 29. Australia has moved away from arbitral clauses in investment treaties in order to protect domestic 
business. See also Nottage, supra note 29. 
43
 See INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, DECLARATIONS RECOGNIZING THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
AS COMPULSORY, supra note 29; Nottage supra note 29. 
44
 Wilson, supra note 15, at ¶ 28. 
45
 Ministerial Statement, supra note 25. 
46
 For motives behind states’ use of “guerrilla tactics” see, e.g., Kolo, supra note 3, at 47. 
47
 See, e.g., Valentina Vadi & Lukasz Gruszczynski, Standards of Review in International Investment Law 
and Arbitration: Multilevel Governance and the Commonwealth, J. OF INT’L ECON. L., at 7, first published 
online Aug. 22, 2013, http://jiel.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2013/08/22/jiel.jgt022.full.pdf+html; 
William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Private Litigation in a Public Law Sphere: The Standard 
of Review in Investor-State Arbitrations, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 283, 312-13 (2010) (authors outlining that 
evidence of “ulterior economic motives” or a distant connection between interests and actions could allow a 
tribunal to not give deference to the state). 
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IV. ARBITRAL SYSTEMS’ CURRENT RESPONSES TO “GUERRILLA TACTICS” 
Recent studies of “guerrilla tactics” in arbitration present divergent views on how 
to effectively sanction or prevent these actions.
48
 Although many authors cite examples 
of “guerrilla tactics,” there are fewer examples of tribunal sanctions.49 The arbitral 
tribunal’s and the ICJ’s decisions in Timor-Leste v. Australia may set a strong precedent 
for future sanctions in state-to-state investment disputes.  
Currently, there are no adopted international arbitration rules for ethical behavior. 
Therefore, for the sake of predictability, many tribunals apply the national standards of 
the seat of arbitration when sanctioning behavior.
50
 The other option is for parties, 
tribunals, or administering agencies to develop their own standards for ethical behavior to 
govern the dispute. This option would result in sanctions based on precedent, but it would 
be less predictable, consistent, and binding.
51
 
In the common law system there are several examples of courts sanctioning 
lawyers and firms for frivolous, dilatory actions.
52
 In the United States, courts rely on 28 
U.S.C. §1927, which requires attorneys unreasonably extending proceedings to bear the 
costs personally.
53
 Courts will also affirm arbitral sanctions for bad faith conduct, even 
when it contradicts stipulations in the contract.
54
 If the frivolous behavior was especially 
egregious, firms may be required to comply with shaming sanctions.
55
 Nevertheless, there 
is no uniformity to the sanctions across jurisdictions. Courts recognize the necessity of 
sanctions because the recourse to arbitration is meant to be a more efficient alternative to 
the courts.
56
 The majority of sanctions, however, are for obvious tactics, and there are 
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few examples of sanctions for overly-zealous representation.
57
 Recognition of “guerrilla 
tactics” is not enough to prevent the behavior without a broadly applicable solution. 
There is a greater range of “guerrilla tactics” in civil law systems because of the 
highly procedural nature of the adjudication system. Therefore, any attempt to thwart or 
delay fair proceedings may be considered a “guerrilla tactic.”58 For example, the Mexican 
arbitral system saw an increase in “guerrilla tactics” when domestic litigators began to 
arbitrate and engaged in dilatory tactics, the destruction of court evidence, and criminal 
intimidation.
59
 Mexico attempts to protect an individual’s constitutional rights through 
procedural rules and review standards, but such protections do not protect the arbitral 
system itself.
60
 In Mexico, sanctions for “guerrilla tactics” are generally limited to 
awarding costs, which some believe addresses the problem without addressing the 
litigators’ behavior.61 Regardless of the possible “correct” results reached by tribunals, 
the system is not addressing the root cause of “guerrilla tactics,” so such behaviors are 
likely to continue. 
Romania, as compared to Mexico, recognizes bad faith behaviors and has rules to 
counteract such “guerrilla tactics.”62 The sanctioning rules are explicit and limit the 
definition of unacceptable behaviors, but there is a high burden of proof that is difficult to 
meet when evidence is unavailable.
63
 Unlike Mexico, Romania’s procedural rules can be 
used to prevent or sanction “guerrilla tactics.”64 Romanian law emphasizes the 
importance of identifying and sanctioning “guerrilla tactics” whenever possible to protect 
arbitration and thereby prevent future wrongdoing.  
The ICJ will likely be reluctant to impose sanctions for “guerrilla tactics” in 
Timor-Leste v. Australia because it must be deferential to States to maintain consent to 
                                                 
57
 Elul, supra note 52, at 131-33. 
58
 Bernard F. Meyer-Hauser & Martina Wirz, Chapter 3, §3.02: Guerrilla Tactics and How-to-Counter 
Them in National Litigation: [B] Experiences from the Civil Law System, in GUERRILLA TACTICS IN 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 134, 134-35, (Günther J. Horvath & Stephan Wilske eds., 2013). 
59
 See, e.g., Wöss, supra note 9 (the author also noted that such tactics were seen more frequently in 
adjudication involving political issues). 
60
 Id. The author explains procedural safeguards include application of the UNCITRAL rules for the burden 
of proof and the “indirect amparo” proceeding for awards. 
61
 Id. 
62
 Oprisan, supra note 2.  
63
 Id. 
64
 Id. These sanctions include: continuing proceedings even if one party is non-participatory, interim 
measures to protect assets, and awarding costs. 
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jurisdiction.
65
 The ICJ also frequently avoids sanctioning behavior because such a 
qualification is a culturally-biased determination.
66
  
V.   CONCLUSION 
The dispute between Timor-Leste and Australia provides the ICJ with an 
opportunity to enter the international debate about the efficacy, enforceability, and 
application of universal ethical standards.
67
  The greatest concern in this case is that the 
stronger party used its sovereign powers to exploit a weaker party for economic gain. The 
outcomes of these cases may establish the appropriate protections for treaty negotiations 
between unbalanced parties. This case brings the idea of “guerrilla tactics” to the 
forefront of state-to-state arbitration and is likely to enhance the discussion of control and 
response to such actions in adjudicatory proceedings.
68
 Further allegations against 
Australia may be evidence of a consistent pattern of the use of “guerrilla tactics” in 
international affairs.
69
 
 The extreme examples of “guerrilla tactics” receive the most attention, but 
dilatory tactics that turn arbitration into a dispute of attrition decided by wealth is 
inherently more dangerous. The acceptance of such tactics could mean the downfall of 
arbitration internationally. Timor-Leste v. Australia is an opportunity for the international 
arbitration community to acknowledge and accept responsibility for preventing “guerrilla 
tactics” in all its forms and sanctioning it strongly when it does occur. What some authors 
are calling an epidemic must be brought under control so that such behaviors do not 
become the norm in future arbitration proceedings.
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